The National Council on Public Procurement (NCPP) is one of Nigeria's two federal procurement regulatory authorities established by the Public Procurement Act 2007. More than seven years after the statutory establishment of the NCPP, the body is yet to be constituted; consequently, there is no proper performance of its statutory functions. This has continued to generate debate in several quarters. In response, the Federal Government has advanced various reasons for not constituting the body, which are mostly based on misconceptions about the status and functions of the body. Nonetheless, the non-constitution of the Council still has implications for Nigerian public procurement system. This article examines NCPP's status and functions, critiques identified misconceptions about the body, analyses the implications of not constituting the regulatory body, and assesses the benefits of constituting it.
Introduction
A country's public procurement system operates through institutions and management structures, including regulatory bodies. The National Council on Public Procurement (NCPP or Council) is one of Nigeria's two federal procurement regulatory authorities established by the Public Procurement Act 2007 (PPA or Act).
More than seven years after the statutory establishment of the NCPP, the body is yet to be constituted; consequently, there is no proper performance of its statutory functions. This has continued to generate debate in several quarters, including the National Assembly (Nigeria's federal legislature), This article shall examine NCPP's status and functions, critique identified misconceptions about the body, analyse the implications of not constituting the regulatory body, and assess the benefits of constituting it. The theme is topical for three reasons. First is the critical statutory role that the NCPP is intended to play in Nigeria's procurement system and by extension its economy, currently estimated to be the largest in Africa. 5 Second, is that the related issues are still largely unsettled. 6 Third, is that a new administration was sworn in on 29 th  thus there may be a reconsideration of the stance of the Federal Government on the constitution of the NCPP. Even when the NCPP is hopefully constituted, the issues addressed here will still be topical since they are germane to understanding and delimiting the powers and operations of the Council.
Before addressing the issues raised above, it is apposite to briefly consider the historical background to the establishment of the Council, as it will enhance appreciation of the issues.
Historical background
There was no statutory regulation of public procurement in Nigeria until 4 th July
7 During the period, extant Financial Regulations (FR) issued by the Minister of
Finance , 8 stipulated the composition and award limits of contract-awarding authorities (such as Tender Boards) for each government entity. But, it neither prescribed tender procedures nor created procurement regulatory functions. 9 Thus, there was no independent body exercising oversight on public procurement practices; except that the Minister undertook routine finance management control to ensure fiscal discipline in public expenditure. 10 In addition, there was no formal mechanism to involve or encourage citizens and civil society organizations (CSOs) in undertaking social accountability or audit of public procurement. 11 Social accountability refers to the broad range of actions and mechanisms beyond voting that citizens can use to help the government to be more effective and 5 It has an estimated nominal GDP of USD 510 billion. See AfDB, OECD & UNDP, 2014:2. The Economist, 2014 . BBC, 2014 Academic work, such as Udeh & Ahmadu 2013:149; Williams-Elegbe 2012:348; Osuntogun 2012:149-150 , have drawn attention to the non-constitution of the NCPP, but has scarcely addressed the related issues, since these issues were not the focus of the work. 7 The date the PPA was enacted. 8 Pursuant to Finance (Control and Management) Act 1958 Cap F26 LFN 2004 s 4. The FR was a set of internal rules on financial control of the Federal administration. They were supplemented by internal circulars and guidelines issued by certain authorized officers. 9 For example, there was no rule on bid advertisement, procurement methods, bid evaluation criteria, etc. World Bank, 2000:7. 10 Finance (Control and Management) Act s 3. 11 On the significance of social accountability or audit to public procurement systems, see: OECD-DAC/World Bank, 2006:44-45. accountable.
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Another weakness of the procurement system then was that government contracting authorities, within their award limits, had liberty to award to any contractor of their choice; which undermined competition and also the enforcement role that would have been played by bidders through challenge adopted, it will vest majority deliberative votes on the CSO-members and will further enhance their potential influence in the Council. But as explained in 4 1 3 below, it is most unlikely that this practice would be adopted.
From the foregoing, the NCPP could be regarded as partly a formal mechanism to involve CSOs towards enhancing integrity and accountability in public procurement, as would be seen in in 4 1 2 and 6 below. Unfortunately, one of the reasons why the Federal Government has not constituted the NCPP is its concerns about the composition, discussed under 4 1 3 below. As hinted in the introduction, although the Council is not yet constituted, it is regarded as an existing statutory body. The implication of this is discussed under 4 1 1 below.
2 Functions
The functions of the NCPP establish it as an approval authority, and to an extent as a regulatory authority, over the BPP. These functions are here broadly classified as its "core functions" and "other functions". Its core functions are those specifically provided in section 2 (entitled "Functions of the Council"), under part 1 of the PPA (which deals exclusively with the NCPP). The "other functions" are those that are provided at various other parts of the PPA (which may be unnoticed on a cursory look). This classification is necessary because it has been observed that many academic discourses and publications on the functions or powers of the NCPP focus on those under part 1. 29 Thus, this classification will draw needed attention to the other functions of the Council.
2 1 Core functions
The following are the core functions of the NCPP: 29 See for example Osuntogun 2012:145-146 ; however, approval of code of conduct was mentioned in 152. See also Onyekpere, 2013; Citizen Confidential, 2012; and Akalugo, 2011. 30 PPA, s 2. Monetary and prior review thresholds mentioned in function (a) respectively refer to:
the value limit in Naira set by the Bureau/NCPP outside of which an approving authority may not award a procurement contract; 33 and the value limit of contracts that require BPP's "certificate of no objection" before the award of such contracts.
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For monetary thresholds, the higher the value of contract the higher the level of authority that can award it; also, more number of persons or offices are required to constitute the approving authority for higher value contracts. 35 In the same vein, it is high-value contracts 36 that are subject to BPP's prior review or no objection certification. The importance of setting these thresholds is that they are used to ensure stricter control or scrutiny in the award of high-value contracts; to reduce chances of corruption or mismanagement, which will result in higher economic loss than in low-value contracts. Some monetary and prior review thresholds are set by 31 See also ss 5(a) and 18. 32 See also s 13(5). 33 Section 60: "Monetary threshold". The NCPP is added in the above definition of monetary threshold because s 60 is considered together with other relevant sections relating to setting of monetary thresholds, as would be discussed under this subheading. "Approval authorities" refer to various persons or group of persons that have powers to award contracts (that fall within their award limits) for their respective organizations. 34 Sections 7(1), 16(1)-(4). 35 For example, Permanent Secretaries (accounting officers) of Federal ministries have powers to award goods and services contracts of below N 5 million, and works contracts of below N 10 million; whereas the Ministerial Tenders Board (usually composed of the Permanent Secretary, as Chairman, and the Directors heading various departments in the Ministry) awards goods and services contracts of N 5 million to less than N 100 million, and works contract of N 10 million to less than N 1.0 billion; the Federal Executive Council (composed of the President, the vice-President and all ministers) is the approving authority for goods and services contracts of N 100 million and above, and works contracts of over N 1.0 billion. See FGN, 2009:3. 36 Goods and services contracts of N 100 million and above, and works contracts of over N 1.0 billion. See FGN, 2009:3. the BPP, 37 but subject to the approval or amendment of the NCPP. According to some provisions of the Act, the NCPP may generally set these thresholds. 40 The interpretation may be that the NCPP will do so by amending the thresholds set and presented for approval by the Bureau; or that it has powers to set thresholds on matters which the BPP is not specifically empowered to set thresholds on. This is reasonable considering that section 5(c) (on BPP's functions), stipulates that the BPP shall certify procurements subject to thresholds as may be set by the NCPP; and section 6(1)(a) (on BPP's powers) states that the BPP shall "enforce the monetary and prior review thresholds set by the Council". As these indicate, setting of thresholds by BPP is not mentioned under the functions or powers of BPP. In addition, where the Act stated that the BPP may set thresholds, it specifically identified the procurement matters involved; it conversely did not identify specific matters where it stated that NCPP may set thresholds. (f) is an omnibus clause; yet it is limited and incidental to carrying out the specified functions of the Council, as would be discussed in 4 2 3 below.
2 2 Other functions
In addition to the above core functions of the Council, the following are some of its other functions: 
Misconceptions
The misconceptions about the NCPP generally relate to its status and functions. The misconceptions are therefore critiqued under those broad aspects.
1 About its status

1 1 Not established or non-existent
Since the Council is neither constituted nor performing its functions, it has been regarded that the body does not exist or is not established. 54 However, according to the court in Cupero case, 55 although the NCPP is yet to be constituted, it is a misconception to opine that it is non-existent or not established. This view is correct, as section 1 (1) It is only when a quorum is formed that the Council can vote or perform its functions. This is not obviated by section 59(4) of the PPA that provides that the validity of any proceeding of the Council shall not be adversely affected by any vacancy in its membership: for a quorum must be formed before such vacancy can become immaterial.
Thirdly, apart from the necessity of forming a quorum, the Council cannot be complete without its CSO membership; for the intendment of the Act is to establish a public procurement system driven by public-private sector partnership. As noted by the OECD/World Bank MAPS, this partnership is critical to the functionality of the public procurement market.
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If it becomes accepted that the NCPP is deemed as constituted, this will prevent the Federal Government from properly constituting the body (considering its stance on it); which will deny the system of the intended benefits of establishing the body, discussed in 4 1 3 and 6 below.
1 3 Concerns about part-time members
As hinted in 4 1 3 above, one of the reasons disclosed by the Federal Government for not constituting the NCPP is its concerns about the loyalty and role of the parttime or CSO membership of the Council; which is apparently as a result of a misconception about the requirements of the law on their appointment and power (voting strength). 66 There is a view that the designated CSO-members shall be appointed by the President, in consultation with or as nominated or recommended by the respective CSOs that the PPA indicates shall be represented in the Council. 67 It may be advisable for the President to work according to this view, to secure the institutional support and participation of these CSOs. However, the President reserves the right to appoint these members without consulting or getting 64 Section 27(1)(a) "Where a body established by an enactment comprises three or more persons, then any act which the body is authorised or required to do may be done in the name of the body by a majority of those persons or of a quorum of them". 65 Another concern about the CSO membership is that they may vote against and therefore delay the adoption of procurement policies favoured by the government.
This concern is valid but misconceived, considering that the NCPP's permanent (public-officer) members have more voting strength than the part-time members, by virtue of section 27 (1) These arguments are highly contestable. First, according to the PPA, sections 2 and 17, the NCPP is an approving authority for public procurement policies, not for award of contracts. In other words, it has no power or function to approve or award contracts; rather it approves general policies relating to procedures for award and administration of government contracts. Likewise, section 2(a) that vests the NCPP with power to "consider, approve and amend the monetary and prior review thresholds for the application of the provisions of this Act by procuring entities" is to the effect that the NCPP may by itself amend, or approve (when amended by the BPP): (1) the laid down monetary value (thresholds) of contracts that an approving authority can award; and, (2) the established value of contracts that may be subject 72 will result if it is taken that only PTB and MTB are the approving authorities for contracts.
Whether the FEC decides to be involved in approving or awarding contracts or to abstain, the administration is held responsible for the contracts awarded and their execution within its term. 
2 3 Controls the BPP
It has been stated that:
79 For an illustration of the fact that the head of a government and his administration bear the responsibility for government contracts awarded in the administration, whether or not he was directly involved, see the following examples that relate to the United States of America (considering that reference was made, in Suleiman, 2013 to the USA in attempting to argue against FEC's involvement in approving certain contracts): Ivory, 2013; Perley, 2010; Capaccio, 2010 . Capaccio, T., 2010 . 80 Citizen Confidential, 2012 Attah, 2012. 81 See generally section 144. 82 The PPA does not provide special procedures for their removal; thus, they are subject to the Interpretation Act s 11 that vests on an appointer the power to remove an appointee.
" [T] he NCPP exerts control over the administration of BPP to ensure that the objectives of the Act are not defeated. It gives directives for implementation to the BPP to ensure that it does not depart from the fundamental principles for procurement."
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The statement did not delimit the extent of control or directives that the Council can respectively exert or give to the BPP. This may give the erroneous impression that the Council has direct control over the day-to-day administration of the BPP and that the BPP takes instructions on all matters from the Council. However, such wide control over the BPP is neither expressed nor contemplated by the law. It will negate the spirit of the law, which intends to confer substantial independence from procuring entities on the BPP-84 recall that four of the six government members of the NCPP are heads of procuring entities. 85 The control that the Council will have over the BPP generally relates to exercising approval authority on certain actions or decisions of the BPP, where stipulated by the PPA. Even the BPP's staff regulations to be made by the Council would not be in the form of Council giving day-to-day directives to BPP. Rather, it will issue the regulations and the BPP will be allowed to operationalize it; akin to the relationship between the legislature and the executive.
The second statement in the quote above may have been based on section 2(f) of the PPA, which empowers the Council to: "give such other directives and perform such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the objectives of this Act". 86 However, this provision does not support the aforementioned statement. The provision is the last paragraph of section 2; the preceding paragraphs enumerate the specific powers or functions of the Council. Thus paragraph (f) is to be read in conjunction with and only within the context of the preceding paragraphs. This position is supported by the ejusdem generis rule, which holds that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or phrase will be 83 could be viewed as a clause expressing the incident power of NCPP. Incident power is " [a] power that, although not expressly granted, must exist because it is necessary to the accomplishment of an express power". 88 The foregoing leads inevitably to the conclusion that the non-specific power in paragraph (f) of section 2 is intended to be used only for achieving the Council's explicit functions contained in the preceding paragraphs. For example, for the purpose of carrying out its function of receiving and considering for approval the audited account of the BPP, the Council would be able to give directive to the BPP to forward its audited account; for the purpose of approving new procurement policies (especially if contentious), the Council could undertake incidental functions such as conducting a public hearing or receiving and considering memoranda from the public on the subject-matter.
Generally, failing to appropriately delimit the Council's apparent omnibus powers in section 2(f) will result in absurdity unintended by the PPA. Since the provision did not specify the person or organisation to which the NCPP's directives shall be to, the power will not only be regarded as exercisable in relation to the BPP, but also exercisable in every procurement matter. To that extent, the Council could rely on the provision to procure for any government entity, contrary to the intendment of the Act. In the same vein, the provision may be construed, absurdly though, as given the Council the power to give directives to anybody, including the President.
As hinted above under this section, the misconceptions on the status and functions of the NCPP have contributed to the Federal Government's unwillingness to constitute the body. This has implications for the Nigeria's procurement system. The refusal to constitute the Council has set the Presidency on collision course with the National Assembly since the inception of the PPA to date. The publicised deliberate non-compliance of the executive with an existing law could in the opinion of the National Assembly constitute a gross misconduct which warrants invoking certain punitive measures against the executive.
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In addition, the refusal impugns the commitment of the Federal Government to the integrity of the procurement system, considering that the action frustrates the regulatory functions that the law intends the Council to perform. Not constituting the Council may suggest that the government is not keen or sincere about following through with its touted legal and practical reforms in the procurement system. This may reduce support by its international development partners in this regard.
There is a domino effect of the refusal to constitute the NCPP on the states. Most states model their public procurement laws after that of the Federal Government.
The states where the procurement laws have established procurement regulatory bodies similar to the NCPP have also followed the example of the Federal Government in refusing to constitute such bodies.
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Apart from the illegality of not constituting the NCPP, the situation denies the system of numerous benefits inherent in the functions of the body. For example, the intended checks on BPP's regulatory and procurement operations are lost; 97 the direct participation of CSOs in procurement regulatory activities through their 94 Elendu v Ekwoaba (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt.386) 704 750-751:"[T]he implication of the term locus standi is very clear. It literally means a "place to stand" hence a standing to sue. In law, it denotes the legal capacity to institute proceedings in a court of law. In Nigeria, it is a constitutional requirement to enable a person to maintain an action and is limited to the prosecution of matters relating to the civil right and obligations of the plaintiffs be that plaintiff a person or persons, government or authority or any other juristic person …. To entitle a person to invoke judicial power, he must show that either his personal interest will immediately be or has been adversely affected by the action or that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury to himself and which interest or injury is over and above that of the general public. What constitutes a legal right, sufficient special interest or interest adversely affected will, of course, depend on the facts of each case." See also Adesanya v President of Nigeria (1981 ) 5 SC. 112 -191, (1981 See s 143 of the Constitution; and by virtue of s 80 of the Constitution the National Assembly can withhold approval of budget meant for public procurement regulatory functions. 96 To mention a few: Anambra, Cross River, Enugu, Jigawa, and Niger. 97 The BPP has a fund and can award contracts towards the discharge of its functions; in such limited instances it stands as a procuring entity.
Council's membership is lost; also the expertise that the members from professional organisations would have brought directly into procurement policy-making and practices through the NCPP is lost.
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Benefits of constituting the NCCP It suffices to generally capture the benefits of constituting the Council by stating that such will reverse the negative effects of not constituting it. However, it is apposite to emphasis a few specific benefits. First, the Council's function will enrich public procurement regulatory functions of the BPP; as the Council will specialise in considering and approving relevant propositions and actions, while the BPP will specialise in operationalizing them. This will make BPP more focused, accountable and responsive to its regulatory functions over the whole system. Secondly, CSOs' direct or indirect involvement in the constituted NCPP will enhance their sense of responsibility and support towards a public procurement system known for its integrity, where deviations are not tolerated. 98 Thirdly, it will result in the certainty and security of Nigeria's procurement policies and regulations, which are currently under the threat of invalidation for not being approved by the Council. Fourthly, the states will follow the good example set by the Federal Government to pursue full procurement reform implementation, including constituting their own equivalent of the NCPP, where provided.
Conclusion
The failure to constitute the Council is indicative of a dichotomy between procurement regulations and their implementation or enforcement in Nigeria. It is noteworthy that the Federal Government had in recent past attempted to amend the PPA to alter the status and functions of the NCPP. 99 This was also clearly owing to the misconceptions about the Council's status and functions. Even though it may not be advisable to undertake the amendment of the PPA in this regard, considering the foregoing discourse, it is more tenable for the executive to send a bill to the National Assembly to amend the PPA than refusing to comply with an existing law. If the new President inaugurates the Council, how it will operate and how other authorities and persons will relate to it will depend on the extent of understanding of its status, functions and the issues addressed in this paper. Thus, this discourse will continue to be relevant even when the NCPP is hopefully inaugurated.
NCPP, or even to scrap it. It may argue that it wishes to scrap the Council in accordance with the new administration's policy of running a lean government and reducing the cost of governance; that it wishes to transfer the Council's functions to an already existing administrative structure, such as the Federal Executive Council. It will then be left for the National Assembly to decide whether to amend the PPA, and to what extent.
